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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas and mineral law in Texas, from October 1, 2001,
through November 1, 2002. The cases examined include decisions
of courts of the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.1
II. CONVEYANCING ISSUES
Exxon Corp. v. Breezevale Ltd.2 holds that an oral participation agree-
ment for a 2 1/2% working interest is unenforceable under the statute of
frauds. 3 Breezevale assisted Exxon for eighteen months in Exxon's pur-
suit of exploration rights in Nigeria. There was no formal agreement in
place; and, at the last meeting between Breezevale and Exxon to discuss
their relationship, the parties discussed both a services contract and a par-
ticipation agreement. The parties' dispute as to whether an oral working
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney-at-Law,
Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
1. This article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas and mineral law, decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states, are
not included.
2. Exxon Corp. v. Breezevale Ltd., 82 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet.
filed).
3. Id. at 443.
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interest agreement was reached at that meeting became the basis for
Breezevale's lawsuit against Exxon.4 The jury found the parties had en-
tered into an oral agreement and valued the interest at $34.3 million. 5
On appeal, Exxon defended by invoking the statute of frauds, which
generally provides that a contract for the sale of real estate "is not en-
forceable unless the promise or agreement, or a memorandum of it, is (1)
in writing; and (2) signed by the person to be charged. ' '6 "Whether a
contract falls within the statute of frauds is a question of law to be de-
cided by the court."' 7 Breezevale contended that the interest it was to
acquire was in the nature of a contractual right to a share of the produc-
tion. Therefore, Breezevale contended that it was not an interest in real
estate and was not subject to the statute of frauds.8
The Dallas Appellate court held that "the relevant issue in determining
whether the contract involves real estate is not whether title to minerals
passes, but whether the interest is derived from rights to oil and gas in the
ground, making the interest a realty interest subject to the statute of
frauds."9 The profits of land, including a working interest, a royalty inter-
est, and an overriding royalty interest, are subject to the statute of
frauds.10 The court concluded that "the interest in this case derived from
rights to oil in the ground and is a property interest subject to the statute
of frauds."'
In Greer v. J. Hiram Moore, Ltd.,' 2 the court determined that a
"Mother Hubbard" clause in a deed will not convey a significant property
interest not clearly contemplated by the language of the conveyance.' 3
Greer and her three sisters each received a twenty-acre tract out of an
eighty-acre tract owned by their mother. 14 Each sister received all of the
surface, one-fourth of the minerals, and the executive rights on her own
particular tract, as well as a one-fourth non-participating royalty interest
in the other three tracts.15
Greer's tract was Tract 3. Greer's sisters leased Tracts 1 and 2, which
were pooled into the SixS Frels Gas Unit. Greer conveyed her interest in
the SixS Frels Gas Unit by a royalty deed that included a Mother Hub-
bard clause. Moore, as successor to Greer's grantee, claimed that the
Mother Hubbard clause included Tract 3.16 This particular form of
4. Id. at 434-35.
5. Id. at 435.
6. Id. at 435-36 (quoting TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 2002)).
7. Exxon, 82 S.W.2d at 436 (citing Gerstacker v. Blum, 884 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied),
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 436-37.
11. Id. at 437.
12. Greer v. J. Hiram Moore, Ltd., 72 S.W.3d 436 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002,
pet. filed).
13. Id. at 44 1.
14. Id. at 437.
15. Id. at 438.
16. Id.
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Mother Hubbard clause included "all of grantor's royalty and overriding
royalty interest in all oil, gas and other minerals in the above named
county or counties, whether actually or properly described herein or not
"17
Moore claimed everything Greer owned in Wharton County.18 Moore
cited a number of cases that upheld grants of interests within specified
areas.19 The court distinguished these cases because in each case the
deed at issue clearly showed that the grantor intended to convey all of his
interests in the specified area. 20 Because Greer's deed contained a spe-
cific description of the pooled unit, a specified area which did not include
Tract 3, the court found that Moore's cases were inapplicable and applied
the established interpretation of Mother Hubbard clauses. 21 The leading
case is Jones v. Colle,22 which holds that Mother Hubbard clauses are
limited to minor interests that are unambiguously intended to be part of
larger conveyances. 23 The property interest in Tract 3 was significant;
and, therefore, the Mother Hubbard clause did not convey Tract 3.24
Hanzel v. Herring25 holds that the deeds from a sheriff's sale were void
because the property descriptions contained in them were inadequate. 26
The descriptions used in the sheriff's deeds were in the following format:
Tract #1 .025000 Overriding Royalty Interest, Crumpton-Williams
Wells, Lease 1404, Texas Railroad Commission Number 19281, T. H.
Wooley Survey, Abstract 1634 and James Karcher Survey, Abstract
276, Palo Pinto County, Texas (Tax Account Numbers 140420007515,
1404200075151).27
The proponents of the deed presented evidence from a former em-
ployee of the Texas Railroad Commission.28 He testified as to Railroad
Commission practices in numbering leases and identified certain commis-
sion documents hw used to identify the land. However, because no lease
was in the record, the court found the description inadequate. 29 Whether
including the lease in the record would have saved the legal description is
unclear, but it is clear that using Railroad Commission lease numbers will
not, by themselves, constitute an adequate legal description.
Moore v. Energy States, Inc.30 applies the strip-and-gore doctrine, es-
toppel by deed, and the appurtenances doctrine in a deed construction
17. Id.
18. Id. at 438.
19. Id. at 439-40.
20. Id. at 440.
21. Id.
22. Jones v. Colle, 727 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1987).
23. Greer, 72 S.W.3d at 441.
24. Id.
25. Hanzel v. Herring, 80 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
26. Id. at 172.
27. Id. at 171.
28. Id. at 172.
29. Id. at 171-72.




case. At issue was a small strip of land containing ten to twenty-five acres
located between a railroad right-of-way and a public road.31 The deed in
question recited that the entire tract conveyed was located "South of the
T. & P. Ry. Co. right of way and South of the Public road which lies
immediately south of said T. & P. Ry. Co. right of way." 32 Plaintiffs
sought to recover for drainage from the contested strip. Defendants pre-
vailed on summary judgment.33
The judgment was affirmed on three grounds. Under the strip-and-
gore doctrine, a narrow strip of land adjoining a conveyed tract which
ceases to be of use after the conveyance will be presumed to be included
in the conveyance, unless the grantor explicitly reserves the strip in plain
and specific language. 34 Moreover, "when a deed conveys land abutting a
street, public highway, or railroad right-of-way, title to the center of the
street, public highway, or railroad right-of-way also passes by the deed."
35
The Eastland Appellate court held that any "land that may lie between
the two rights-of-way was not expressly reserved;" and, therefore, the
doctrine of strip-and-gore applied. 36
Because the deed recited "that the public road 'lies immediately south'
of the railroad right-of-way," the plaintiffs were "estopped from denying
that the public road lies immediately south of the railroad right-of-
way."' 37 Estoppel by deed precluded any claim to title to the land be-
tween the public road and the railroad-right-of-way. 38 The deed also
granted all "rights and appurtenances thereto. '39 The court held that
"appurtenances" would include the public road and railroad rights-of-
way. 40
Wilderness Cove, Ltd. v. Cold Spring Granite Co.4' is a case of first
impression holding that the deed in question created a severable, domi-
nant mineral estate in granite. 42 Grantors owned an undivided one-half
interest in the property, when, by an 1890 deed ("Granite Deed"), they
conveyed:
[A]II of our interest in and to the Granite on the ... land together
with the necessary right of way to the extent of any interest in the
same for constructing a Rail Road and for quarrying and handling
the said Granite. 43
31. Id. at 798.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 797.
34. Id. at 799.
35. Id. at 799.
36. Id. at 800.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 798.
40. Id. at 800.
41. Wilderness Cove, Ltd. v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 62 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2001, no pet.).
42. Id. at 849.
43. Id. at 845-46.
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At the time of the litigation, Wilderness Cove owned all of the surface
estate and an undivided one-half interest in the granite. Cold Spring
owned an unspecified fractional interest in the granite derived from the
grantee's interest under the Granite Deed.44 Wilderness Cove began pre-
paring the property for development as a lakefront property because
thirty acres fronted on Lake LBJ.45 Cold Spring asserted its rights to
quarry the granite, which would make the property unsuitable for devel-
opment as lakefront property.46 The trial court held that Cold Spring was
the owner of the granite as a cotenant and that Cold Spring had the right
to develop the granite.47 The judgment was affirmed. 48
It is well established in Texas that a severance of oil and gas creates a
"separate corporeal estate in the minerals. '49 In this case, the court ex-
tends that doctrine to specific conveyances of minerals other than oil and
gas.50 The "clear intent expressed in the Granite Deed was to convey the
in situ granite deposit as a severable estate. '51 Wilderness Cove relied
upon cases in which a general conveyance of minerals was held not to
include building stone, which belonged to the surface estate as a matter of
law.52 The court rejected this argument because the Granite Deed was an
"express conveyance of an in situ deposit of granite. '53
The court also held that, even if the conveyance had been expressed as
a general conveyance of "minerals," this particular granite would meet
the test of qualifying as a mineral.54 Heinatz v. Allen55 holds that sub-
stances that might not be minerals in the "ordinary and natural meaning
of the word," are minerals, if "they are rare and exceptional in character
or possess a peculiar property giving them special value .... "56 The
granite in this case was the uniquely red granite from Burnet County that
was being used for the construction of the new state capitol building in
Austin, and the consideration paid in 1890 for the Granite Deed was ap-
proximately $30 per acre, or $200,000.57 Furthermore, all the rules of
presumed intent announced in earlier cases do not apply "when there is
an express conveyance of a specific substance. 58
44. Id. at 846.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 847.
48. Id. at 845.
49. Id. at 849.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 847-49 (citing Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex.
1984); Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); Reed v. Wylie, 544 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.
1997); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
53. Wilderness Cove, 62 S.W.3d at 849.
54. Id.
55. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
56. Id. at 518.
57. Wilderness Cove, 62 S.W.3d at 846.
58. Id. at 849 (quoting Schwarz v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 1986)).
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The court found that the estate in the granite was a dominant mineral
estate that included the "right to make necessary and reasonable use of
the surface to remove the minerals. '59 Wilderness Cove argued that the
issue was more complex, because the grantor in the Granite Deed was
merely a cotenant in the property (owning an undivided one-half), and no
cotenant could grant the right "to enter.., and destroy the surface estate
without the consent of all of the cotenants. '60 The court rejected Wilder-
ness Cove's argument that "Cold Spring's only right was to receive a por-
tion of the proceeds if Wilderness Cove ever chose to quarry and sell the.
granite. '61 Wilderness Cove owned a one-half interest in the surface,
burdened by the Granite Deed.62 Wilderness Cove also owned a one-half
interest in the surface, not burdened by the Granite Deed, but subject to
the rights of Cold Spring to develop its interest in the mineral estate.
Cold Spring owned the right to partition. Cold Springs' severable granite
estate is the dominant estate.63
III. OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
A. LEASING
Broughton Associates Joint Venture v. Boudreaux64 is a case involving
waiver of the covenant of warranty of title in an exchange of a bank draft
and an oil and gas lease. Lessee Broughton met with lessor Boudreaux to
negotiate an oil and gas lease, which resulted in the contemporaneous
exchange of an oil, gas and mineral lease for a bank draft for bonus con-
sideration. 65 The executed lease contained a general warranty of title,
and the bonus consideration for the lease was calculated at the rate of
$750.00 per acre for an estimated 399 net mineral acres. 66 The bank draft
provided: "On approval of lease or mineral deed described hereon, and
on approval of title to same by drawee not later than 15 banking days
after arrival of this draft at collecting bank. '67
Shortly after the funds to pay the draft had been wired to the
Boudreauxs' bank account, Broughton discovered that the Boudreauxs
owned substantially less than the 399 acres for which they had been paid.
Broughton contacted the Boudreauxs requesting a refund of the overpaid
amount, which the Boudreauxs refused. Broughton then filed suit.68
At trial, the court rendered a directed verdict on behalf of Broughton
concluding that the Boudreauxs had breached their covenant of general
59. Id. at 849.
60. Id. at 850.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 846 n.4 and 850-51
63. Id. at 851.
64. Broughton Assoc. Joint Venture v. Boudreaux, 70 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App.-Waco
2002, no pet.).
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warranty of title and that Broughton had suffered damages as a result.69
However, the court submitted to the jury the defensive issue of waiver,
and the jury found that Broughton had waived the Boudreauxs' failure to
comply with the warranty of title in the lease.70
On appeal, the court noted that the Texas Supreme Court had previ-
ously held that the provision "15 days after sight and upon approval of
title" on the face of a draft made approval of title a condition precedent
to formation of a contract."' 71 Both parties agreed that the purpose of the
fifteen-day provision in the Boudreaux was to afford Broughton an op-
portunity to check the title.72 However, the court found that the funding
of the draft waived the condition precedent; and thereafter, "Broughton
could no longer exercise its right to approve title prior to its liability on
the draft."' 73 Broughton effectively lost the right to approve or disap-
prove title prior to paying. However, Broughton's suit was brought to
enforce the covenant of warranty in the lease.74
The court observed "that a contemporaneously exchanged draft and
deed must be construed together. '75 Yet the execution of a draft and
deed does not always immediately create a binding bilateral contract, as
the formation of a contract may be contingent on a condition precedent. 76
"When a promise is subject to a condition precedent, there can be no
breach of contract until such condition or contingency is performed or
occurs."' 77 The court reasoned that the condition precedent in the draft
"effectively protected Broughton from paying for the property if it disap-
proved of the title," and "thus, at the time of the exchange of the draft
and the deed between Broughton and the Boudreauxs, there was no
binding contract. '78
A condition precedent may also be waived, and the waiver of a condi-
tion precedent may be inferred from the conduct of a party. 79 The
Boudreauxs claimed that Broughton's funding of the draft constituted a
waiver of the covenant of warranty of title in the lease.80 The court dis-
agreed with the Boudreauxs' argument, stating that for their argument to
be valid, "the funding of the draft simultaneously created a bilateral con-
tract (the lease) and waived an express provision of that same contract."'s
The court found that Broughton could not exercise its right to approve
title prior to its liability on the draft, and because there was no binding
69. Id. at 327.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 328 (quoting Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Benton, 728 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex.
1987)).
72. Id. at 326.
73. Id. at 329.
74. Id. at 327.









contract between the parties until the draft was funded, Broughton could
not have waived the right to enforce the covenant of warranty of title by
funding the draft.82 Consequently, since there could be no waiver of a
contractual right when there is no contract yet in existence, the jury sub-
mission on waiver was improper.83
The significance of the case is that it confirms the general nature of a
transaction involving a bank draft and a lease. There are few reported
cases, but the industry's general understanding is supported by the case
law.84 The bank draft with the condition as to title gives lessee a window
in which to approve or disapprove title without liability. After the win-
dow closes, the lease is no longer available. Broughton holds that once
the draft is funded, the window closes and lessee's right to approve title
prior to payment is waived. 85 However, funding of the draft does not
waive a suit for breach of warranty based on the lease covenant. The case
suggests that delay in enforcing the warranty may waive the covenant.
Oakrock Exploration Co. v. Killam86 considers whether an offer to
lease that is accepted by the landowner constituted an enforceable con-
tract. Oakrock was attempting to lease a tract that was still subject to an
unreleased lease owned by an operator in bankruptcy. 87 Oakrock sent an
offer letter to the landowners as follows:
Oakrock Exploration Company ("Oakrock") proposes to offer you,
and all of the remaining members of your family who own mineral
interest under the 154 acre Oscar Ramirez tract in southern Zapata
County, a bonus of $300 per acre for a one-year Oil, Gas & Mineral
Lease with a twenty [five] percent [25%] royalty on the acreage de-
scribed and shown on the attached plat and lease description. (This
lease is just south of the El Tigre Chiquito bridge approximately 20
miles south of Zapata, Texas).
It is Oakrock's understanding that the operator of the existing well
which is perpetuating the present Oil, Gas & Mineral Lease, Mus-
tang Oil & Gas, has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Federal
Bankruptcy Court. From the $300 per acre bonus, we will pay a non-
refundable bonus consideration of $50.00 per acre until such time as
a Release of the existing Oil, Gas & Mineral Lease is obtained from
Mustang Oil & Gas ....
Oakrock will pay all legal expenses for Mr. George Person . . . to
represent you and the rest of your family concerning the drafting of a
new Oil, Gas & Mineral Lease to Oakrock, file all the proper mo-
tions, orders and a lawsuit, if necessary, to obtain Release of the ex-
isting Oil, Gas & Mineral Lease .... Additionally, Oakrock will pay
82. Id. at 329
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Benton, 728 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1987).
85. See Broughton Assocs. Joint Venture v. Bourdeaux, 70 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. App.-
Waco 2002, no pet.).
86. Oakrock Exploration Co. v. Killam, 87 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002,
pet. denied).
87. Id. at 687.
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for all legal expenses for a federal bankruptcy attorney, if necessary,
to force this issue through Bankruptcy Court.
It is our recommendation that a[n] Oil, Gas & Mineral Lease will be
drawn up by Mr. Person (the "Oakrock Lease") and submitted to
you for your review and approval....
Should the basic terms of this proposal be acceptable to you at this
time, subject to your final review and acceptance of the terms and
conditions of an acceptable Oil, Gas & Mineral Lease, then we
would appreciate you signing and returning one (1) copy of this let-
ter to my attention .... 88
The letter was signed by the landowners, and the non-refundable fee was
paid.89 The landowners did not sign the lease.90
The court held that the subject matter of the offer letter was an oil and
gas lease, and therefore, the offer had to contain the essential terms de-
scriptive of the lease.91 Among the essential terms to an oil and gas lease
are the term of the lease, the drilling commencement date, time and
amount of payments in lieu of drilling operations, and amounts to be paid
for produced gas,92 pooling, offset well obligations, and warranties.93 Be-
cause the letters lacked these essential terms, the letters did not suffi-
ciently identify the subject matter of the contract, and therefore, the
letter was not enforceable as a contract. 94 The opinion is silent as to the
effect of the partial performance represented by the payment of the non-
refundable bonus.
The holding in the case suggests that an offer letter that does not in-
clude the complete form of the lease is not likely to be construed as an
enforceable contract. The opinion is silent as to the effect of the language
in the letter that made acceptance subject to "your final review and ac-
ceptance of the terms and conditions of an acceptable Oil, Gas & Mineral
Lease . . .95
B. LEASE TERMINATION
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson,96 holds that a well capable of
production will sustain a lease without additional drilling or reworking
operations, even if actual production ceases for more than sixty days. 97
This is the first case to be decided among several important cessation-of-
production cases that have recently reached the Texas Supreme Court.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 688.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 690.
92. Id. at 690-91 (citing Smith v. Sabine Royalty Corp., 556 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 691.
95. Id.
96. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2002).
97. Id. at 553.
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The Texas Panhandle has been a hotbed of litigation brought by lessors
alleging lease termination. 98 The alleged lease termination claims are
typically based on Railroad Commission records showing no actual pro-
duction for one or more cessations in excess of the permitted time inter-
val under the lease cessation-of-production clause (typically sixty or
ninety days). The cessation alleged is frequently attributable to a time
twenty or thirty years prior to the filing of suit. The defendant lessee then
has a serious evidentiary problem because of the difficulty inherent in
producing any records or testimony as to the reason for a cessation which
occurred so long ago.
In this particular case, it was undisputed that production totally ceased
for sixty-one days in 1981 and ninety-one days in 1985 while the gas pur-
chaser conducted pipeline repairs. 99 The lessor, Thompson, sued for ter-
mination of the lease and conversion damages. 100 The lessee, Anadarko,
defended on the express language in the habendum clause of the lease.
The court ultimately agreed with Anadarko. However, the opinion is
very narrowly written, so that little else is decided except the construction
to be given to the particular form of habendum clause found in this par-
ticular lease. The habendum in this lease provided: "This lease shall re-
main in force for a term of one (1) year and as long thereafter as gas is or
can be produced."' 01
The lease's cessation-of-production clause was a typical sixty-day clause,
which provided:
If, after the expiration of the primary term of this lease, production
on the leased premises shall cease from any cause, this lease shall not
terminate provided lessee resumes operations for drilling a well
within sixty (60) days from such cessation, and this lease shall remain
in force during the prosecution of such operations and if production
results therefrom, then as long as production continues. 10 2
There is a well established line of Texas cases holding that actual pro-
duction is necessary to hold a typical Texas lease in force after the expira-
tion of the primary term and any applicable cessation-of-production
clause. 10 3 The previous cases all construed leases in which the habendum
clause sustained the lease as long as oil or gas "is produced."' 0 4 The
court held that these cases were not controlling when the habendum
clause includes the phrase or concept that the well need only be "capable
of producing."'1 5 The court was particularly persuaded by the "plain lan-
guage" of this habendum clause, but it also found that this construction
98. See, e.g., cases cited and reviewed in Richard F. Brown, Oil, Gas and Mineral Law,
55 SMU L. REV. 1219, 1222-29 (2002).
99. Anadarko, 94 S.W.3d at 553.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 553.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 554-55.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 556.
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was consistent with and in harmony with the cessation-of-production
clause. 10 6 The cessation-of-production clause contemplates the drilling of
a new well, which would not make sense, if there was already a well capa-
ble of producing. 10 7 The court expressly held that "the cessation-of-pro-
duction clause only applies if the lease would otherwise terminate under
the habendum clause." 10 8
The court then defined a well as being "capable of production" if it is
capable of producing in paying quantities without additional equipment
or repairs. It expressly approved the following definition found in Hy-
drocarbon Management, Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc.109:
We believe that the phrase "capable of production in paying quanti-
ties" means a well that will produce in paying quantities if the well is
turned "on," and it begins flowing, without additional equipment or
repair. Conversely, a well would not be capable of producing in pay-
ing quantities if the well switch were turned "on," and the well did
not flow, because of mechanical problems or because the well needs
rods, tubing, or pumping equipment." 110
On motion for rehearing, the court clarified its holding by distinguish-
ing this definition from existing case law defining "production in paying
quantities." For a well "to produce in paying quantities, or to be capable
of producing in paying quantities, there must be facilities located near
enough to the well that it would be economically feasible to establish a
connection so that production could be marketed at a profit." 1I
The case is significant because there are many existing lease forms em-
ploying the "capable of production" language, and perhaps now there will
be even more. The case is also significant because it harmonizes the ha-
bendum clause with the cessation-of-production clause on the basis that a
"savings clause" is only triggered when the lease is not otherwise held to
be in force and effect. This is certainly conventional wisdom. It also
comports with the evolution of the oil and gas lease in Texas, which is
now a patchwork of savings clauses whose intended purpose is to amelio-
rate the harsh results of a cessation of production under a fee simple de-
terminable lease.
The court did not reach any of Anadarko's affirmative defenses, which
included limitations, laches, quasi-estoppel, unjust enrichment, adverse
possession, revivor, judicial estoppel and promissory estoppel. 112 The
court remanded, rather than reversed, presumably because it expects the
trial court to determine whether this particular well was "capable of pro-
106. Id. at 555.
107. Id. at 556.
108. Id. at 557.
109. Hydrocarbon Mgmt., Inc. v. Tracker Exploration, Inc., 861 S.W.2d 427, 427 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo, 1993, no writ).
110. Anadarko, 94 S.W.3d at 557 (quoting Hydrocarbon, 861 S.W.2d at 433-34).
111. Id. at 559.
112. Id. at 557.
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ducing." 3 According to Anadarko's brief, the evidence was undisputed
that the well was capable of producing because the well was shut-in for
pipeline repairs, 114 but the opinion is silent as to the assignment of the
burden of proof. To the extent that a lessee is required to prove that a
well was "capable" of producing many years ago, the proof problems may
persist. However, it is presumably the plaintiff lessor's burden to prove
that the habendum clause was triggered, i.e. that the well was not capable
of producing in paying quantities. Under this form of habendum clause,
it appears that the proof problems are effectively transferred from the
lessee to the lessor. Moreover, under this form of habendum clause,
downstream interruptions (e.g. pipeline failures), will not cause a lease
terminate.
Guinn Investments, Inc. v. Ridge Oil Co.11 5 is a case of first impression
extending the temporary cessation of production doctrine to protect a
lessee of a nonproducing tract against a cessation of production from the
producing tract, when both tracts are under the same lease. The 1937
lease covered two tracts of land. The leasehold in one tract was owned by
Guinn, while the other was owned by Ridge. Although there had been
no production on the Guinn tract since 1950, the lease stayed in effect
during its secondary term by continuous production from the Ridge tract
until 1997. In 1997, Ridge offered to purchase the Guinn tract in order to
complete secondary recovery efforts from a waterflood. Guinn rejected
this offer, leading Ridge to seek the property by other means. Intending
to re-lease both tracts from the lessor, Ridge intentionally and voluntarily
ceased production on the Ridge tract for ninety days in order to termi-
nate the 1937 lease.'1 6 During the ninety-day cessation of production,
Ridge wrote a letter to the lessor explaining his plan to re-lease the
Guinn tract. In addition, Ridge voluntarily continued to pay royalties to
the lessors during the stoppage. Ridge then obtained a new lease.11 7
At trial, the issue was whether the 1937 lease had terminated. The trial
court granted summary judgment to Ridge. 118 On appeal Guinn's main
argument against cessation was that the temporary cessation of produc-
tion (TCOP) doctrine kept the 1937 lease alive." 9 The TCOP doctrine
generally holds that when production in the secondary term of a lease
stops due to a stoppage in the well or a failure of equipment, or the like,




115. Guinn Invs., Inc. v. Ridge Oil Co., 73 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002,
pet. granted).
116. Id. at 526.
117. Id. at 527.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 528.
120. Id. at 529.
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Ridge contended that the TCOP doctrine only protects "operator"
leases and not those whose interest is only held by the production of
other operators. 121 In support of this argument, Ridge cited many cases
in which the TCOP doctrine protected operator lessees from lapses. 122
No party cited any case in which the TCOP doctrine was specifically used
preserve the interest of a non-producing lessee whose interest was kept in
effect by another's production. Thus, the court reviewed this issue as one
of first impression. 123 Ridge also contended that Ridge's voluntary cessa-
tion of production could not give rise to the application of the doctrine.1 24
Ridge finally contended that the surrendering of the original lease and act
of taking a new lease effectively terminated the original lease.125
The court did not accept Ridge's arguments. Because production on
any tract covered by the original lease perpetuated the lease for all the
tracts, the TCOP doctrine applies to all tracts.' 26 The court first reasoned
that there was a long, well-established line of Texas cases holding that,
"unless superseded by express provisions in a lease, production from any
one part" of the lease "will perpetuate an oil and gas lease beyond the
primary terms as to all tracts included in the lease. ' 127 The court found
the case of Cain v. Neumann128 to be particularly persuasive. 29 The Cain
court "held that the lessor and the lessee could not by agreement be-
tween themselves release and thereby destroy the interests of the non-
producing interests. '1 30 "The identity of the owner of the production is
'unimportant,"' with "the only relevant inquiry" being "whether produc-
tion on any part of the land described by the lease continues."'131
The court also determined that the doctrine is not limited to involun-
tary cessations of production. 32 Because Ridge had clearly stated in cor-
respondence with the lessor that the cessation would last ninety days, and
because he continued to pay royalties throughout the cessation, the court
found that the cessation was clearly temporary. 33 The court also found
that Ridge's surrender of the lease could not affect Guinn's lease. The
court noted that there was not a surrender clause in the 1937 lease, and
that one leaseholder could not surrender merely to destroy the interest of
another leaseholder.1 34
Perhaps the most interesting part of the case was the court's discussion
of the application of the TCOP doctrine to cessations caused by third
121. Id. at 529-30.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 530.
124. Id. at 532.
125. Id. at 535.
126. Id. at 531.
127. Id. at 530 (emphasis added).
128. Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ).
129. Id.
130. Guinn, 73 S.W.3d at 530.
131. Id. at 531.
132. Id. at 532.
133. Id. at 533.
134. Id. at 536.
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parties. 135 Reviewing the case law generally, the court concluded that the
inquiry should be focused on the operator's intent with respect to restor-
ing production, rather than the cause of the stoppage.' 36 The court con-
cludes that the doctrine is not limited to involuntary cessations or to
physical or mechanical causes.' 37 The only fair and just rule is to hold
that the lease continues in force unless the period of cessation is for an
unreasonable length of time.138
C. POOLING CLAUSE
Sabre Oil & Gas Corp. v. Gibson139 construes atypical pooling and
minimum royalty provisions in an oil and gas lease. In 1957, Gibson's
predecessor in interest executed an oil, gas, and mineral lease to Sabre's
predecessor in interest. 140 The lease covered 38 separate tracts of land.141
Gibson owned all of the minerals in three of the leased tracts, which Sa-
bre acquired.' 42 In April of 1997, Sabre drilled and completed a gas well
on one of the three tracts. 143 On July 29, 1997, Sabre filed a Designation
of Unit for the Gibson #1 Gas Unit, which pooled the Gibson's three
tracts of land with other lands not part of the 1957 lease. 144 Gibson filed
suit against Sabre and others seeking a declaration that the 1957 lease
had terminated as to the Gibson's land and that the Designation of Unit
was void because it was formed in violation of the 1957 lease.' 45 The trial
court denied Gibson's lease termination claim, while granting his unit
designation claim. 146 The court of appeals reversed and remanded the
trial court's latter finding.' 47
Sabre appealed the trial court's ruling that the Designation of Unit was
void, arguing that the trial court erred in narrowly construing the pooling
provision of the 1957 lease.' 48 Paragraph 4 of the lease, the pooling pro-
vision, provided:
Lessee, at his option, is hereby given the right and power to pool or
combine the acreage covered by this lease or any portion thereof,
with other land, lease or leases in the immediate vicinity thereof, to
comprise what is hereinafter called a "unit", when in Lessee's judg-
ment it is necessary or advisable to do so in order properly to de-
velop and operate said premises for the production of oil, gas or
135. Id. at 533-34.
136. See id. at 533.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Frost v. Gulf Oil Corp., 119 So. 2d 759, 762 (Miss. 1960)).
139. Sabre Oil & Gas Corp. v. Gibson, 72 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet.
denied).








148. Id. at 816.
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gaseous substances, including condensate. 149
Additional provisions in paragraph 4a stated:
Notwithstanding any language in Paragraph "4" above, to the con-
trary, it is expressly agreed and understood by and between the par-
ties hereto that before Lessee hereunder shall be allowed to pool or
unitize any of the lands embraced by this lease with other lands not
owned by the Lessor herein Lessee shall designate full units from the
lands embraced by this lease first and in the event there is land in
excess of a full unit remaining then same may be done in accordance
with Paragraph "4" above. 150
Gibson contended that under paragraph 4a, Sabre could not pool other
lands not owned by the lessor until all of the lands embraced by the 1957
lease had been included in full units.15' At the time Sabre filed the Des-
ignation of Unit, not all lands in the 1957 lease were included in units. 152
The appellate court noted that "[i]n the absence of clear language to
the contrary, pooling clauses should not be construed in a narrow or lim-
ited sense."'153 After harmonizing the provisions of the 1957 lease, the
court found it to be an unambiguous instrument and found that the Des-
ignation of Unit was not formed in violation of the lease. 154 The court
gave great weight to paragraph 8 of the lease (the general assignment
clause), which provided, that "[t]he rights of either party hereunder may
be assigned in whole or in part and the provisions hereof shall extend to
the heirs, successors and assigns." The court reasoned that under para-
graph 8, "a lessee who acquired only a portion of the lands covered by the
1957 lease would satisfy the requirements of paragraph 4a if the lessee
included all of the tracts under the lease to which he has been
assigned. '155
More importantly, the record showed not only that these three tracts
were the only land under the 1957 lease assigned to Sabre, 156 but also that
Sabre included all of the tracts owned by the Gibsons in the Designation
of Unit. Because all of the land that Gibson owned was included in the
Designation of Unit, Sabre's creation of the Unit under the lease was
valid. 157
Gibson appealed the trial court's ruling that the 1957 lease did not ter-





153. Id. (citing Elliott v. Davis, 553 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Texaco, Inc. v. Lettermann, 343 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).




158. Id. at 818.
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Subject to the other provisions herein contained, this lease shall be
for a term of 5 years from this date (called the "primary term"), and
so long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced from said
land or unitized area hereunder, and as long as operations are prose-
cuted under the terms hereof.159
Gibson argued that because the 1957 lease is divisible as to each of the
separate tracts, production was required on the three tracts owned by
Gibson to hold the lease. 160
The appellate court noted that "[t]he general rule is that production on
one tract will operate to perpetuate the lease as to all tracts described
therein and covered thereby.' 16' Gibson, however, cited cases that "rec-
ognized that [a] lease may contain clauses for divisibility in which produc-
tion will extend the life of the lease only as to that portion of the
subdivided leasehold on which production is obtained.' 62 Gibson then
claimed that various provisions of the 1957 lease, 163 "when read together
with the habendum clause indicate that the 1957 lease is not to be read as
a single lease but, rather, as separate leases for each tract of land."'164
The court rejected Gibson's argument, observing that in each of the cases
cited by Gibson, the lease in question "contained additional language
modifying the habendum clause and providing for termination as to lands
not included in a producing unit."'1 65 In Gibson's 1957 lease, no such lan-
guage existed; therefore, the court reasoned that, "production was not
required on each tract of land in order to extend the lease."'1 66 Thus,
because there was production on the land included in the 1957 lease, the
appellate court held that the lease did not terminate. 167
Gibson also argued that the 1957 lease terminated under the rental
clause.168 Paragraph 5 of the lease provided that the lease would termi-
nate if drilling operations were not commenced on or before a year from
the date of the lease unless the lessee paid the lessor "the sum of One
Dollar per acre for all mineral acres owned by lessors . . . which shall
cover the privilege of deferring commencement of drilling operations for
a period of twelve (12) months."'1 69 Paragraph 5a provided:
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Mathews v. Sun Oil Co., 425 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1968); Sun Operating Ltd.
P'ship v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, writ denied)).
162. Id. at 818-19 (citing Riley v. Meriwether, 780 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1989, writ denied); Gibson Drilling Co. v. B & N Petroleum, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 822 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); SMK Energy Corp. v. Westchester Gas Co., 705
S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fisher v. Walker, 683 S.W.2d
885 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
163. Id. at 818. The provisions included paragraph 3, "a typical royalty clause;" para-
graph 4a, an "atypical pooling clause addendum;" and paragraph 5a, "an atypical minimum
royalty provision." Id.
164. Id.
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Lessee guarantees that the royalties and/or rentals payable under
this lease shall equal or exceed a sum of money equal to One Dollar
($1.00) per acre for each acre of land covered by this lease for each
twelve month period during which this lease remains in force and,
notwithstanding any other provision contained in this lease, the Lessee
binds himself, his heirs, successors and assigns, to pay a minimum
rental each year while this lease remains in force equal to One Dollar
($1.00) per acre for each acre of land covered by this lease, and in the
event the royalties payable by Lessee, his heirs, successors and as-
signs, shall amount to less than One Dollar ($1.00) per acre for each
acre of land covered by this lease during each twelve month period
while this lease is in force, then and in such event, the difference
between the amount paid and One Dollar ($1.00) per acre for each
acre of land covered by this lease for said period of time shall be paid
by the Lessee, his heirs, successors and assigns, to Lessor, and in the
event of failure to make any such payment (which payment shall be
due not later than thirty (30) days after the expiration of any twelve
month period during which this lease is in force) when such payment
is due shall terminate this lease as to both parties.170
Relying on these provisions, Gibson urged that the emphasized language
in paragraph 5a obligated Sabre to pay one dollar per acre in rental pay-
ments on all tracts where there is no production.171 Or, in the alternative,
Gibson claimed that the language "One Dollar ($1.00) per acre for each
acre" should be understood to mean that each mineral owner under the
1957 lease should receive a minimum of one dollar for each acre they own
whether the production is from their lands or not.172
The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that "[a]fter the expiration of
the primary term, the payment of rentals will not keep a lease in ef-
fect."' 73 While "under the terms of the 1957 lease, the lessee was obli-
gated to make a minimum royalty payment of one dollar per acre," the
court held that "Paragraph No. 5a does not require a rental payment in
addition to the royalty payment."'1 74
Finally, in a procedural matter of some interest, the court ruled that the
sixty other royalty owners in the unit were not necessary parties. 175 Al-
though this holding appears to be contra to the well-established authority
of Veal v. Thomason,176 the court found that amendments to Rule 39 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure discarded the concepts of "necessary"
and indispensable" parties. 177 Although those royalty owners "had an
170. Id. (emphasis in original).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Tennant v. Matthews, 19 S.W.2d 1115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929,
writ ref'd)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 815-16.
176. Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942).
177. Sabre, 72 S.W.3d at 815-16 (citing Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Carper v. Holamich, 610 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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interest in that their share of the production from the pooled unit would
be affected," their joinder "was not necessary. '178
D. ROYALTY CLAUSE
Neel v. Killam Oil Co.1 79 construes a disputed royalty deed, the Texas
Division Order Statute, the statute of limitations applicable to unpaid
royalty, and the obligation to pay interest on unpaid royalty. In 1945,
when a nonparticipating royalty deed was executed, the land described in
the deed was subject to an oil and gas lease that provided for a 1/8th
royalty. That lease expired, and a new lease, providing for a 1/4th royalty,
was executed in 1980.180
The royalty deed used several different fractions to describe the inter-
est conveyed, and it was these differing fractions, coupled with the in-
creased-royalty lease, that triggered the dispute. The royalty deed
conveyed in the granting clause a nonparticipating royalty described as
"an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to all of the oil royalty, gas
royalty, royalty in casing head gas and gasoline . *.".."181 The "existing
lease" clause in the royalty deed made the conveyance subject to the ex-
isting lease, but recited that the conveyance "covers and includes one-half
(1/2) of all the oil royalty, gas royalty, casing head gas and gasoline roy-
alty, and royalty from other minerals or products, due and to be paid
under the terms of the said lease .... ,,182 Although not recited in the
opinion, the royalty deed apparently included a 1/16th "fee development"
clause and a 1/8th "minimum royalty" clause.183 Finally, the deed in-
cluded a 1/16th "future lease" clause, which read as follows:
In the event the present oil, gas and mineral lease or leases covering
the above described property, or any part thereof, if there be any
such lease or leases, terminate, lapse or is forfeited, then Grantee
shall own and be entitled to receive as a free royalty [1/16th] .... -184
After the 1980 lease was executed, defendant lessees paid 1/2 of the
royalty (1/2 x 1/4 = 1/8) to the nonparticipating owner. 85 Lessees relied
upon Alford v. Krum,186 in which the Texas Supreme Court held that
"when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the clauses of a deed,
the granting clause prevails over all other provisions."' 187
In 1991, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the Alford approach in
Luckel v. White,' 88 which required a "four corners" analysis of deeds with
178. Id. at 816.
179. Neel v. Killam Oil Co., 88 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet.
denied).
180. Id. at 338.
181. Id. at 337.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 340.
184. Id. at 338.
185. Id.
186. Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).
187. Neel, 88 S.W.3d at 338 (citing Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 870).
188. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991).
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provisions that contain conflicting fractional interests. 189 The defendant
lessees concluded that, under Luckel, the nonparticipating royalty owner
was only entitled to 1/16th.190 The nonparticipating royalty owner re-
fused to sign a new division order for a 1/16th interest, and the lessees
suspended all payments to the nonparticipating royalty owner. 191
After analyzing the "four corners" of the deed, the court concluded
that the lessees were right-the nonparticipating royalty intended by the
parties in the royalty deed under a new lease was a fixed 1/16th interest in
production (and not 1/8th under the 1980 lease). 192 As to the unpaid 1/
16th to which the nonparticipating royalty owner was entitled, a claim for
unpaid royalty is a suit on a debt, and suit "is barred if it is not com-
menced within four years of the date the cause of action accrued."'1 93
Therefore, the nonparticipating royalty owners were "barred from recov-
ering any royalties that accrued more than four years before the date the
suit was filed."' 194
The defendant lessees contended they were not obligated to pay pre-
judgment interest on the unpaid 1/16th under the Texas Division Order
Statute.195 Section 91.402(b)(1) of that statute specifies that "payments
may be withheld without interest ... when there is 'a dispute concerning
title that would affect distribution of payments."1 96 Because the lessees
did not dispute the nonparticipating royalty owner's claim to a 1/16th roy-
alty, the court held that there could not be a "dispute concerning title"
for purposes of the statutory right to withhold payment without inter-
est.197 The nonparticipating royalty owner had refused to sign division
orders for a 1/16th interest. The court did not accept the lessees' conten-
tion that this refusal to sign the division order justified withholding pay-
ment without interest.198 The court supported its decision by stating that
if the nonparticipating royalty owner had signed the reduced-interest di-
vision order, doing so would waive the nonparticipating royalty owner's
claim to the larger interest.1 99
The court's opinion on this point does not seem well reasoned. First,
the title dispute was not whether the lessees disputed the nonparticipat-
ing royalty owner's title. The title dispute was between competing claim-
ants to funds that the lessee was attempting to pay to the rightful owner.
There not only was a dispute, but this nonparticipating royalty owner lost
the dispute. Second, while it is true that there was no apparent dispute to
189. Neel, 88 S.W.3d at 338.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 341.
193. Id. at 342 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(3) (Vernon
2002)).
194. Id. at 343.
195. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402-.403 (Vernon 2001).
196. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 94.102(b)(1) (Vernon 2001).
197. Neel, 88 S.W.3d at 341.
198. Id. at 341-42.
199. Id. at 342.
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a 1/16th interest, the lessee as a payor under the statute is still entitled to
a signed division order before making payment. Section 91.402(c)(1)(C)
of the Texas Division Order Statute200 provides that "[a]s a condition to
payment of royalties to a payee, a payor is entitled to receive a signed
division containing certain provisions, among which is 'the fractional and/
or decimal interest in production claimed by [the] payee .... ",,201 It is
apparently undisputed that the lessees received a division order as to a 1/
8th interest, but never as to a 1/16th interest.202 The whole concept be-
hind division orders is to assure the payor that 100% of the proceeds are
accounted for and not in dispute. If a 1/16th interest was not in dispute,
the nonparticipating royalty owner should have signed a division order
for that amount. Under the court's reasoning, every payee could claim
100% of the royalty, and the lessee would be obligated to somehow de-
vine the interest actually owned by each payee and pay them correctly.
Third, the court's opinion that signing such a division order would auto-
matically waive the claim to the larger interest is unsupportable. 20 3 The
court assumes the nonparticipating royalty owner would sign the division
order without making it clear that the division order as to the reduced
interest was signed without prejudice to the claim to the larger interest.
A one sentence cover letter would eliminate any chance that accepting
payment for the undisputed interest could be construed as a waiver. The
court's opinion does not promote the policy behind the statute of forcing
competing payees to resolve their differences at their own expense, rather
than at the expense of the payor. Nor does it promote the policy behind
the statute of assuring payors that they may safely pay in accordance with
division orders. If the payors are not insulated from the claims, then the
payors will file suit and interplead the claimants, which just complicates
the underlying dispute, increases costs, and fosters litigation. Suspension
without interest is an incentive to the payees to promptly resolve their
own disputes.
E. DRAINAGE
Kerr McGee Corp. v. Helton204 is a drainage case brought by lessor
Helton against lessee Kerr McGee for breach of the implied lease cove-
nant to protect from drainage. Kerr McGee was the lessee on the drained
tract as well as the offsetting producing tract.205 Damages were based on
what the hypothetical protection well on the drained tract would have
theoretically produced, rather than the amount of gas drained by the
draining well.20 6 The court conceded that there may be some conflict as
200. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402(c)(1)(C).
201. Neel, 88 S.W.3d at 341.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 341-42.
204. Kerr McGee Corp. v. Helton, No. 07-01-0263-CV (Tex. App.-Amarillo Jan. 28,
2002, pet. granted) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 110433.
205. Id. at *1.
206. Id. at *5-6.
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to the proper measure of damages.207 However, because Kerr-McGee
failed to specifically assign as error the measure of damages and only
raised the issue as a "no evidence" point, the court avoided the legal
question and simply found sufficient evidence upon which to affirm the
judgment. 20 8 The court also affirmed prejudgment interest from the date
suit was filed.20 9
F. SURFACE RIGHTS
Exxon Corp. v. Pluff °10 holds that the common lease clause giving
lessee the right to remove equipment does not impose a duty to remove
equipment, and that the cause of action for damage to the surface belongs
only to the owner of the surface at the time the damage occurs.21' Exxon
drilled several wells on a small ten-acre tract during the 1930's and ceased
all operations on the property in 1984.212 Pluff purchased the surface in
1992 when the property was still cluttered with oilfield junk.213 The trial
court ruled that Exxon had a duty to remove the oilfield materials from
the property, and the jury then found Exxon failed to remove the materi-
als and awarded Pluff $30,000 in damages. 214
The appellate court relied heavily upon Senn v. Texaco 215 in finding
that Pluff had no standing to sue.2 16 Existing case law clearly establishes
that "a cause of action for injury to real property accrues when the injury
is committed," "the right to sue is a personal right that belongs to the
person who owns the property at the time of the injury," and the right to
sue "does not pass to a subsequent purchaser of the property" unless
there is an express assignment of the cause of action.2 17 "Consequently, a
mere subsequent purchaser [of the property] cannot recover for an injury
committed before his purchase. 218 Pluff was critical of the holding in
Senn, which "disregard[ed] the distinction between permanent and tem-
porary injury to land. '219 Nevertheless, the court held that "the charac-
terization of the injury was not important; it was the fact of injury that was
critical. 220
207. Id. at *6 (citing S.E. Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 977 S.W.2d 393, 399-400 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 977 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1999) and Shell
Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 401 S.W.2d 623, 628-29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
208. Id.
209. Id. at *9.
210. Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 24-25 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, pet. denied).
211. Id. at 30-31.
212. Id. at 24-25.
213. Id. at 25.
214. Id. at 26.
215. Senn v. Texaco, 55 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied).
216. Exxon, 94 S.W.3d at 27-28.
217. Id. (citing Abbott v. City of Princeton, 721 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 28.
220. Id. (citing Lay, 599 S.W.2d at 686) (emphasis in original).
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The lease provided that "[Exxon] shall have the right at any time dur-
ing or after the expiration of this lease to remove all property and fixtures
placed by [Exxon] on said land including the right to draw and remove all
casing. '2 21 Pluff contended that this clause imposed a duty on Exxon to
remove oilfield materials. 222 The court refused to find an express duty,
and relied upon Warren Petroleum v. Monzingo223 in refusing to find an
implied duty to remove oilfield materials. 224 There is no "implied duty to
repair the damage done to the land caused by rightful and necessary
use. "225
IV. SEISMIC
DDD Energy, Inc. v. Veritas DGC Land, Inc.,226 is a case involving
indemnification for surface damages resulting from seismic operations.
The landowner's original lessee conveyed interests in the oil and gas lease
to three companies, one of which was DDD.227 Lessee DDD then en-
tered into an agreement for geophysical services on the landowner's land
with seismic contractor Veritas. Included within the geophysical services
agreement was an indemnity provision that provided that Veritas would
indemnify lessee DDD for the negligent acts or omissions of Veritas in
conducting seismic operations. 228 The agreement did not expressly pro-
vide that Veritas would indemnify DDD for DDD's own negligence.2 29
Upon discovering damage to his property, including the destruction of
numerous oak and mesquite trees, the Landowner filed suit against lessee
DDD.230 DDD then brought suit against Veritas, seeking a declaratory
judgment that Veritas was obligated to defend and indemnify DDD,
under the terms of the parties' agreement. 231 Veritas moved for summary
judgment, asserting that claims based on damage to the landowner's land
caused by lessee DDD's own negligence were not covered by the indem-
nity clause, because the indemnity provision did not meet the express
negligence test.232 The trial court agreed with Veritas.2 33
On appeal, the court noted that "[u]nder the express negligence doc-
trine, a party contracting for indemnity from the consequences of its own
negligence must express that intent in specific terms within the four cor-
221. Id. at 29.
222. Id.
223. Warren Petroleum v. Mozingo, 304 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1957).
224. Exxon, 94 S.W.2d at 30.
225. Id. (quoting Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d at 363).
226. DDD Energy, Inc. v. Veritas DGC Land, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).





232. Id. at 883.
233. Id.
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ners of the contract. '234 Consequently, "[i]ndemnity provisions that do
not state the intent of the parties within the four corners of the instru-
ment are unenforceable as a matter of law."235
DDD contended that the express negligence test does not apply in this
case because only Veritas was negligent, that the fair notice requirements
were not applicable because Veritas had actual notice of the indemnity
provision, and that, even if the express negligence rule applied as to negli-
gence claims, it did not bar DDD's request for indemnification as to the
landowner's other claims against DDD.236
Veritas argued that the indemnity clause did not meet the express neg-
ligence test and that the indemnity clause did not contain language in-
demnifying DDD from its own negligence as against a third party
claim.237 The court held that the indemnity provision failed the express
negligence test.238 However, as to those claims brought by the landowner
against DDD which were not based on DDD's negligence, the court held
that Veritas was required to defend and indemnify DDD.239 The court
held that the express negligence rule did not apply to indemnification for
those claims.240
Taylor v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P.241 addresses liability for surface
damages from seismic operations. Taylor leased the land for mineral ex-
ploration.2 42 Brigham, after obtaining permission from a minority work-
ing interest owner, engaged Veritas Geophysical, Ltd., to conduct seismic
exploration upon the property.2 43 When Brigham and Veritas attempted
to perform seismic operations, Taylor refused them entry, threatening to
meet them with a shotgun.2 44 Veritas sued for declaratory judgment, en-
tered the property and conducted the exploratory operations. 245 Taylor
counterclaimed for damages, claiming that the exploration encroached
upon more of the surface than was reasonably necessary and that Veritas
negligently and maliciously damaged portions of the surface estate.246
Brigham and Veritas moved for summary judgment, contending that
Brigham had a right to enter the property to conduct seismic operations
and that Taylor had no evidence that they breached any duty owed to
him, or that they acted with malice.247 The trial court granted Brigham's
234. Id. (citing Fisk Elec. Co. v. Constructors & Assoc., Inc., 888 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex.
1994)).
235. Id. (citing Fisk Elec., 888 S.W.2d at 814).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 884.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 885.
240. Id.
241. Taylor v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., No. 07-00-0225-CV (Tex. App.-Amarillo Jan.
16, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 58423.









The right to use the surface estate to explore for oil and gas is not an
absolute one.249 "Unless the parties agree otherwise, the entity perform-
ing the operations may not commit negligence nor use more of the sur-
face than reasonably necessary. ' 250 However, "evidence that damage
occurred to the surface while exploring for minerals alone is not evidence
of negligence or unreasonably excessive use. '251
Established law in Texas provides that the mineral estate is the domi-
nant estate.252 Ownership of the mineral estate includes the right to ex-
plore.253 In addition, it is settled law that if in pursuing these rights, the
servient surface estate is susceptible to use in only one manner, then the
owner of the dominant estate may pursue that use irrespective of whether
it results in damage to the surface, and the mineral owner is not liable for
the damage. 254 The burden is on "the surface owner to establish that the
[mineral owner] failed to use reasonable care in pursuing its rights or that
the rights could have been pursued through reasonable alternate means
sufficient to achieve the goal desired but without the damage. 255
The court held that Taylor failed to establish that Brigham and Veritas
acted negligently, or that they had made an unreasonably excessive use of
the surface estate.256 The court observed that Taylor failed to place into
evidence any information describing what seismic exploration reasonably
entails.257 In addition, the court reasoned that Taylor failed to establish
the goals sought to by achieved by Brigham and Veritas in conducting
seismic operations, what effort was reasonably necessary to achieve such
goals, and whether the goals could have been achieved through alternate,
reasonable means which would not have resulted in any of the alleged
damage. ' 258 Similarly, Taylor failed to prove that the damages allegedly
committed were not the reasonable result of the seismic activities under-
taken, or that the acts of either Brigham or Veritas were unreasonable.259
Thus, all Taylor provided was "evidence of purported damage arising
from the activities of Brigham and Veritas," and because "proof of dam-
ages is not [by itself] evidence of unreasonable care or conduct," the ap-
pellate court held that the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. 260
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (citing Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967);
Oryx Energy Co. v. Shelton, 942 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, no writ)).
251. Id.
252. Id. at *2 (citing Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Haupt,




256. Id. at *2-3.
257. Id. at *2.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at *3.
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V. OPERATING AGREEMENTS
Cone v. Fagadau Energy Corp.261 is a lengthy opinion construing and
applying the A.A.P.L. Form 610-1982 Model Form Operating Agreement
("JOA") in a dispute between the operator Fagadau Energy Corp.
("FEC") and one of the small non-operators, Kenneth G. Cone. 262 FEC
proposed a water flood and unitization, which was approved by all of the
working interest owners, except Cone. 263 FEC proceeded despite Cone's
objections, and production was substantially increased.264
Article VII of the JOA titled "Expenditures and Liability of Parties"
stated in relevant part:
VII.D.3. Other Operations: Without the consent of all parties, Oper-
ator shall not undertake any single project reasonably estimated to
require an expenditure in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars
($15,000.00) except in connection with a well, the drilling, reworking,
deepening, completing, recompleting, or plugging back of which has
been previously authorized by or pursuant to this agreement. 265
The water flood exceeded $15,000, and Cone relied upon this provision to
assert that FEC could not institute the water flood without his consent. 266
The court rejected this argument and held that the contractual provision
limiting expenditures did not limit each mineral owner's underlying right
as a co-tenant to extract minerals from common property without first
obtaining the consent of his co-tenants. 267 "If a co-tenant owning a small
interest in the land had to give his consent," that small owner could "arbi-
trarily destroy the valuable quality of the land. 268 The contractual provi-
sion only limited the expenditures that the operator could charge to the
other owners. Although it may appear this provision limits activities in
the Contract Area, it is only an accounting limitation, not a restriction on
operations. 269 The court expressly rejected the holding in Texstar North
America, Inc. v. Ladd Petroleum Corp.,270 which found that a similar limi-
tation ("Without the consent of all parties, no well shall be reworked or
plugged back") was a limitation on operations.271 The extracting co-ten-
ant would have to account to the non-extracting co-tenant under the
usual rules applicable to co-tenancy. 272 The JOA contractual provision is
simply "a limitation on the non-operator's exposure to liability for ex-
261. Cone v. Fagadau Energy Corp., 68 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet.
denied).
262. Id. at 152.
263. Id. at 151.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 157 (emphasis in original). These are blanks on the form JOA to be com-
pleted by the parties to the JOA.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 157-58.
268. Id. at 157.
269. Id.
270. Texstar N. Am., Inc. v. Ladd Petroleum Corp., 809 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied.).
271. Cone, 68 S.W.3d at 158.
272. Id. at 157 n.5.
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penses incurred by the operator. '273
Cone also complained about the conversion of producing wells into
water injection wells. He contended that under Article VI.E.2 of the
JOA, the wells that were converted were abandoned, and that Cone
should have been offered the right to assume control of the wells.274 The
operative language of the provision is the phrase, "any well which has
been completed as a producer shall not be plugged and abandoned with-
out the consent of all parties. '275 The court rejected Cone's argument,
relying upon the basic meaning of "abandonment," which involves a "re-
linquishment of possession. '2 76 The wells continued to be used every day
and continued to be used to produce hydrocarbons through the same in-
tervals for which Cone was being compensated. 277
The court also construed Art. V.A. of the JOA, which provides:
V.A. Designation and Responsibilities of Operator. [FEC] shall be the
Operator of the Contract Area, and shall conduct and direct and
have full control of all operations on the Contract Area as permitted
and required by, and within the limits of this agreement. It shall con-
duct all such operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but it
shall have no liability as Operator to the other parties for losses sus-
tained or liabilities incurred, expect such as may result form gross
negligence or willful misconduct.278
Although the trial court held Cone to the higher standard of showing
gross negligence or willful misconduct, rather than a simple breach of
contract standard, the appellate court held that Cone's claims were in the
nature of an accounting, and therefore, were simple contract claims. The
gross negligence/willful misconduct requirement only applied to claims
that the operator failed to conduct operations in a good and workmanlike
manner.279
In re Riata Energy, Inc.280 holds that a suit brought for various causes
of action by a non-operator against the operator, Riata, is not a suit to
recover an interest in real property subject to the mandatory venue stat-
ute. The mandatory venue statute provides:
Actions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real
property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances
from the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real prop-
erty, or to quiet title to real property shall be brought in the county
in which all or a part of the property is located.28'
273. Id. at 158.
274. Id. at 152-54.
275. Id. at 154.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 154-55 (emphasis in original).
279. Id.
280. In re Riata Energy, Inc., No. 01-00-01138-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2601, pet. denied) (not designated for publication), 2001 WL 1480291.
281. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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The non-operator sought damages for breach of contract and conversion
and for a declaratory judgment. It sought "to recover monetary damages
for breach of the joint operating agreement, fraud based on representa-
tions made in Riata's capacity as operator, and conversion of the hydro-
carbons recovered from the wells. ''282 These causes of action did not fall
within the statute.283
Saratoga Resources, Inc. v. Baker28 4 holds that the sale of an oil and gas
property included any right to a refund of operating expenses incurred
prior to the sale. Saratoga and Baker entered into an operating agree-
ment for a gas gathering system and salt water disposal well in 1994.285
The operating agreement provided that the expenses would be "borne
75% by Baker and 25% by Saratoga until other arrangements may be
agreed to."' 286 Baker added additional wells to the system in which Sara-
toga had no interest. Saratoga objected and requested an audit, and
Baker refused any adjustment.287 Saratoga then sold out to Prime En-
ergy Corporation ("Prime"), and Saratoga conveyed to Prime "all ac-
counts receivable ... refunds, rights to refunds ... in favor of, owing to,
or possessed or controlled by the Saratoga Companies. '288 Based on a
post-conveyance audit, Saratoga demanded that Baker pay Saratoga a re-
fund in excess of $100,000.289 Baker and Prime worked out a different
cost sharing arrangement for the future. Saratoga sued Baker for the re-
fund. Prime quitclaimed to Saratoga all rights, if any, to recover a refund
of operating expenses prior to the sale.290
The court held that Saratoga conveyed to Prime any claim Saratoga
might have to a refund. 291 Prime and Baker then made an "other ar-
rangement," as contemplated by the original Operating Agreement, to
reduce Prime's operating expenses prospectively. 292 That agreement was
silent as to Saratoga's claim. However, the operating agreement's sharing
arrangement was in place until Baker and Prime changed it. There sim-
ply was no right to a refund.293 The quitclaim deed from Prime to Sara-
toga was of no effect, because there was nothing to convey. 294
282. Riata, 2001 WL 1480291 at *3.
283. Id.
284. Saratoga Res., Inc. v. Baker, 59 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001,
no pet.).




289. Id. at 412-13.
290. Id. at 413.
291. Id. at 414.
292. Id.





It appears that pipeline companies are faced with confusion and con-
flicts among the lower courts concerning the "unable to agree" jurisdic-
tional issue in pipeline condemnation cases. Pipelines derive their power
of eminent domain from Texas Property Code section 21.012(a), which
provides:
If ... a corporation with eminent domain authority ... wants to
acquire real property for public use but is unable to agree with the
owner of the property on the amount of damages, the condemnation
entity may begin a condemnation proceeding by filing a petition in
the proper court.295
The requirement that the condemning entity is unable to agree with the
property owner on the amount of damages prior to instituting a condem-
nation proceeding has been held to be jurisdictional.296 Several opinions
on almost identical facts have recently been written on the meaning of
this "unable to agree" requirement, with no clear resolution.
Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co.,297 out of the Houston
court, focuses on the sole issue of the jurisdictional question of whether
the pipeline company engaged in good faith negotiations and made bona
fide offers as required by the statute.298 The landowners' real objection
was that they simply did not want the pipeline on their property.299 The
landowners fought the condemnation by contending that the pipeline
company did not negotiate in good faith because its offers included the
acquisition of three additional property rights the pipeline had no right to
condemn: (1) the right to transport substances in addition to natural gas;
(2) the obligation to warrant and defend title to the easement; and (3) the
right to assign the easement to any person or entity. 300
The court repeatedly emphasized that "[it] takes very little to satisfy
the negotiate-in-good-faith requirement. ' 30 1 It found "the issue of
whether [the pipeline] could actually condemn the three additional prop-
erty rights [was] simply irrelevant. '30 2 The pipeline company negotiated
for these rights, but never sought to condemn them. "A condemning en-
tity, like any person or entity, is of course, free to negotiate for, offer to
295. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.012(a) (Vernon 1984) (emphasis in original).
296. Cusack Ranch Corp. v. MidTexas Pipeline Co., 71 S.W.3d 395, 397 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2001, pet. granted).
297. Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 65 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. granted).
298. Id. at 794. The opinion is an appeal of four separate cases on the same issue.
Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court recently denied review on the same issue in Hubenak
v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 37 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. de-
nied). In that case, under almost identical facts, the Eastland court held that neither the
landowner nor the condemnor had established either the existence or lack of good faith.
The case was remanded on the fact issue.
299. Hubenak, 65 S.W.3d at 794.
300. Id. at 795.
301. Id. at 798, 799-801.
302. Id. at 801.
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buy, and buy what it desires. '303 The appellate court upheld the trial
court's jurisdiction because the pipeline company made bona fide offers
and further negotiations were futile.304 In its original (withdrawn) opin-
ion, this same court found that the condemnor's failure to first make an
offer including only those rights that it was authorized to acquire through
a condemnation proceeding, amounted to a lack of good faith as a matter
of law.30 5
MidTexas Pipeline Co. v. Dernehl,30 6 out of the Texarkana court, ad-
dresses the same issue, but on facts where there was no evidence that the
pipeline company had ever made an offer which comprehended only the
rights it sought in condemnation. 30 7 The court held that "[o]ffers to
purchase property that included the property to be condemned but going
beyond that in acquiring additional rights or properties is not enough to
satisfy a good faith negotiation. '30 8
Cusack Ranch Corp. v. MidTexas Pipeline Co.,3 0 9 out of the Corpus
Christi court, addresses the same issue and agreed with the analysis
adopted earlier by the Austin court in State v. Hipp,310 quoting with ap-
proval the following:
[A]ll that is required is that there shall be a bona fide attempt to
agree with the owner, and that there shall be an honest disagreement
between the parties as to the compensation which the one is willing
to give and the other is willing to receive. A formal offer and refusal
is not necessary. Nor is it necessary that there should be a series of
offers or prolonged negotiations in order to agree on compensation;
an effort to agree is all that is required; and it is sufficient if the
negotiations proceed far enough to indicate that an agreement is im-
possible. If it is apparent that an effort to agree would be unavailing
and an offer useless, none need be made. The statute does not con-
template an impossibility to purchase at any price, however large,
but merely an unwillingness on the part of the owner to sell at all, or
a willingness on his part to sell only at a price which in petitioner's
judgment is excessive .... 311
Finally, in ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Harrison Interests, Ltd.,312 the
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., Nos. 01-99-00691-CV, 01-99-00959-
CV, 01-99-01359-CV & 01-99-01360-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 27, 2000)
(not designated for publication), 2000 WL 1056416, at *5, withdrawn and superseded by 65
S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. granted).
306. MidTexas Pipeline Co. v. Dernehl, 71 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002,
pet. granted).
307. Id. at 857.
308. Id. at 858.
309. Cusack Ranch Corp. v. MidTexas Pipeline Co., 71 S.W.3d 395 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2002, pet. granted).
310. State v. Hipp, 832 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), rev'd on other grounds,
867 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1993).
311. Id. at 77.
312. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Harrison Interests, Ltd., 93 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist], pet. filed).
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trial court dismisses ExxonMobil's condemnation proceeding for want of
jurisdiction on the basis that "ExxonMobil failed to negotiate in good
faith by requiring Harrison to grant it rights which ExxonMobil was not
entitled to obtain in a condemnation proceeding. '313 Harrison then re-
covered almost $400,000 in damages, professional fees, and costs. 314 The
Houston court reversed.315 The case before it presented a single offer,
for a price far in excess of the appraised value, additional terms, and a
landowner who never responded. 316 The general thrust of the opinion
was to accept the low jurisdictional threshold test described in Hubenak
and Cusack.317
Pinnacle Gas Treating, Inc. v. Read318 holds that a landowner whose
property was condemned for a gas pipeline easement can recover for lost
profits from a chicken farm business that did not exist at the time of the
condemnation. Pinnacle condemned a fifty-foot-wide permanent ease-
ment across Read's land. 319 Read had been in conversations with San-
derson Farms about building broiler houses for chickens on the 61.92
acres in question.320 Part of the land was no longer usable for this pur-
pose after the pipeline easement was taken. The broiler houses were con-
structed on other parts of the land.321
Section 21.044 of the Property Code authorizes the trial court to award
the condemnee "the damages that resulted from the temporary posses-
sion" of the property, but does not define "damages. '322 The court held
that damages under this provision "are not limited to the market or rental
value of the property," and the court refused to exclude "use" of the land
as part of damages.323 Therefore, recovery for the lost profits of the
planned chicken farm were recoverable. 324
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL
Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc.325 considers the use of expert testimony
in a surface and groundwater contamination case. Plaintiffs alleged that
Chevron had negligently polluted both the water and soil of the plaintiff's
ranch, and that Chevron had used more of the ranch's surface estate than
was reasonably necessary to conduct their operations. 326 At trial, the
plaintiffs argued that Chevron's negligent use of oil and salt water injec-
313. Id. at 190.
314. Id. at 191.
315. Id. at 197.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 195.
318. Pinnacle Gas Treating v. Read, 69 S.W.3d 240 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. filed).
319. Id. at 242.
320. Id. at 244.
321. Id.
322. Id. (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.044 (Vernon 1984)).
323. Id. at 245.
324. Id.
325. Anthony v. Chevron USA, Inc., 284 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2002).
326. Id. at 580.
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tion wells, which were completed to a depth of around 3000 feet, resulted
in the contamination of plaintiffs' water wells, which were drilled to a
depth of about 50 feet below the surface.32 7 The plaintiffs' water wells
originally produced water suitable for human consumption; however, by
1988, tests revealed that the chloride levels and total dissolved solids in
the water rendered the water undrinkable.32 8 The plaintiffs also claimed
at trial that oil spills and leakage from pipelines owned and operated by
Chevron caused surface pollution on portions of the ranch.329 At the
close of the plaintiffs' case, Chevron moved for judgment as a matter of
law.330 The court granted Chevron's motion, concluding that the evi-
dence failed to establish that Chevron caused the alleged surface and
groundwater contamination on the ranch, and the evidence failed to es-
tablish the proper amount of damages.331
Applying Texas law, the appellate court noted that Chevron had the
legal right "to use as much of the surface estate as is reasonably necessary
to comply with the terms of the lease and to carry out its purpose. '332
Consequently, for the plaintiffs to recover, "they must establish that this
water and soil contamination was the result of either Chevron's specific
acts of negligence or Chevron's use of more of the [plaintiff's] surface
estate than was reasonably necessary to carry out its oil operations. '333
The plaintiffs relied on the testimony of two expert witnesses to prove
that Chevron had polluted the plaintiffs' water wells.334 One expert wit-
ness attempted to explain, using three different theories, how the salt
water Chevron injected managed to reach the water wells, which were
located one-half mile above the injection zone.335 According to the
court, while the expert's testimony established what could have occurred,
there was no evidence to show what actually had occurred.336 For exam-
ple, the expert did not provide any evidence establishing the nexus be-
tween Chevron's water injection operations and the water well
pollution. 337 Furthermore, the expert failed to address the possibility that
sources other than Chevron caused the salt water contamination. 338 Al-
though the expert's testimony raised suspicions about Chevron's opera-
tions in the area, the court noted that suspicions alone are not enough to
present a question of fact to the jury on the issue of causation. 339
The plaintiffs' second expert witness attempted to address what hap-
327. Id. at 581-82.
328. Id. at 582.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 581.
332. Id. at 583.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 584.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 585-87.





pened to the injected salt water once it reached the water aquifer.340 The
court stated that while the expert's "testimony [was] sufficient to support
a finding that salt water" originating from Chevron's injection wells
"could have reached the" plaintiffs' water wells, the expert's findings
failed to establish causation. 341 For example, the expert failed to perform
any field tests to determine the source of the pollution, instead preferring
to rely upon the first expert witness's assumption that Chevron's wells
were the cause of the contamination. 342 Because the expert failed to in-
dependently verify the source of pollution, the court reasoned that his
testimony cannot support a finding that Chevron caused the water well
contamination. 343
In addition, the expert failed to determine the actual size of the con-
tamination in the aquifer, and his estimates, which ranged from 1/4 mile
to 1/2 mile in width, were too speculative and wide-ranging for a jury to
use in calculating damages to the aquifer.344 Furthermore, the expert's
"own testimony revealed that the level of contamination in the [aquifer]
was fluctuating," even long after Chevron had ceased injections. 345 Thus,
although the plaintiffs claimed that the alleged damages to the aquifer
were permanent, the expert's own testimony suggested otherwise,
thereby unacceptably forcing a jury to speculate as to the extent of the
damages to the aquifer.346
The plaintiffs also relied on the testimony of two other expert witnesses
to prove that Chevron had negligently contaminated the soil of the plain-
tiffs' ranch from leaking oil pipelines.347 Both witnesses attempted to
show Chevron's responsibility for the pollution and the extent of the ap-
plicable damages.348 However, the court held that "a reasonable jury
could not conclude that Chevron was responsible for the soil contamina-
tion based solely on the testimony of these two experts," and further-
more, "could not determine the extent of any damages ...without
resorting to speculation. '349
For example, the court noted that one expert witness admitted that he
could not determine the exact date on which the contamination occurred
and that other oil companies could have in fact caused the soil contami-
nation.350 Likewise, the second expert witness merely took a few isolated
sample readings from each contamination site and used this data to extra-
polate the overall extent of the soil pollution.351 Yet the expert's testi-
340. Id.
341. Id. at 587-88.






348. Id. at 588-89.
349. Id. at 589.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 590.
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mony, in which he admitted "that the depth of the oil contamination
depended upon the length of time the oil had to seep into the soil as well
as variations in the soil," undermined the reliability of his own method.352
Furthermore, the expert relied upon rudimentary methods to determine
the extent of pollution, such as relying solely upon visual observations to
ascertain the perimeter of each pollution area.353 The court thus held
that both expert witnesses failed to establish a legally sufficient eviden-
tiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiffs' soil pollution
claims.354 "[A]ny finding of liability would require the jury to speculate
as to both the cause of the pollution and the extent of the damage to the
surface estate. '355 Thus, finding that the plaintiffs failed to present suffi-
cient evidence establishing causation and damages, the court affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims.356
Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston357 considers whether a city
ordinance banning drilling operations around Lake Houston is an inverse
condemnation of the mineral lessee's rights in the land. Prior to the 1996
annexation of the land around the lake, Houston adopted a city ordi-
nance prohibiting drilling in the "control area" around Lake Houston.358
The control area included most, if not all, of Trail Enterprises' 985-acre
mineral leasehold. 359 Trail Enterprises asserted that the ordinance was
an inverse condemnation. 360 An inverse condemnation is a cause of ac-
tion asserted by a property owner claiming compensation for a govern-
ment taking of property for public use without a condemnation
proceeding or paying adequate compensation.361
One of the grounds for a compensable regulatory taking is that the
restrictions imposed either "(a) deny property owners all economically
viable use of their property, or (b) unreasonably interfere with property
owners' rights to use and enjoy their property. ' 362 "Determining
whether all economically viable use of a property has been denied entails
a relatively simple analysis of whether value remains in the property after
the governmental action. ' 363 "[D]etermining whether the government
has 'unreasonably interfered' . . . requires a consideration of the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation and the extent to which the regulation
interferes with distinct 'investment-backed expectations."364 The "eco-






357. Trail Enters., Inc. v. City of Houston, No. 14-02-00441-CV (Tex. App.-Houston




361. Id. at *1 n.1.





taken with the value that remains.365 It is the existing and permitted uses
of the property that are considered, not anticipated gains or potential fu-
ture profits. 3
66
In this case, the court reversed and remanded the summary judgment
for the City of Houston because "conflicting [expert] affidavits create[d] a
fact issue," and because there was no summary judgment evidence on
whether Trail Enterprises "could realize an economic benefit from the
entirety of its lease, despite the drilling prohibition." 367
Walton v. Phillips Petroleum Company368 considers when suit must be
brought for alleged groundwater contamination from saltwater pits. In
1998, Walton filed suit against Phillips Petroleum Company and other oil
companies, alleging that their operation of open saltwater pits had con-
taminated the groundwater beneath his ranch in Midland County. 369
Walton also alleged that the defendants had failed to prevent the migra-
tion of pollutants from the [saltwater] pits to the groundwater. Phillips
prevailed on its motion for summary judgment, alleging Walton's claim
was barred by the statute of limitations, that his damages, as a matter of
law, were permanent and not temporary, and that there was no evidence
of causation.370
A suit for damages to land is subject to a two-year statute of limita-
tions. 371 Ordinarily, the statute of limitations begins to run when a partic-
ular cause of action accrues. 372 Determining the accrual date is often the
most critical issue. Although determining what rule of accrual to apply is
a question of law, the cause of action "accrues when a wrongful act causes
some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until
later. '373 In determining when a cause of action for damages to land "ac-
crues," a distinction must be drawn between a claim based upon perma-
nent damages and one for temporary damages.374 Causes of "action for
permanent damages to land accrue ... upon the date of discovery of the
first actionable injury, not on the date the damages to the land are fully
ascertainable. '375 "Thus, an action to recover damages for permanent
injury to land must be brought within two years from the date of discov-
ery of the initial injury. ' 376 However, actions "to recover damages for
temporary injuries, because they are transient in nature, may be brought
for those injuries sustained within two years prior to the filing of the
365. Id. at *2 n.5.
366. Id.
367. Id. at *3 n.8.
368. Walton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 65 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, pet.
denied).
369. Id. at 267.
370. Id.
371. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 2002).
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suit. '377 Recovery for groundwater contamination for "temporary" inju-
ries would be limited to the last two years, while a claim for "permanent"
injuries would be lost, if not brought within the first two years.
The continuum of an injury determines whether the injury is perma-
nent or temporary.378 "[A] permanent injury is constant and continu-
ous;" a temporary injury is "sporadic and contingent upon some irregular
force such as rain."'379 When an injury is permanent, "the damages result-
ing from it should all be estimated in one suit;" however, damages from
temporary injuries may be brought in successive actions as they occur.380
To determine whether an injury is permanent or temporary, "it is helpful
to first focus on the activity causing the injury and then the injury
itself."381
The summary judgment evidence produced by Phillips showed that
prior to the late 1960's, oil and gas producers used saltwater pits to dis-
pose of the waste water generated during oil production. 382 However, in
the late 1960's, the Texas Railroad Commission, concerned about ground-
water contamination from surface disposal of produced water, issued
what is commonly referred to as a "no pit" order which prohibited use of
these pits. 3 83 The oil companies, in response to the "no pit" order, back-
filled the saltwater pits located on and near Walton's property.384 By
backfilling the pits, the pits were removed as a source of groundwater
contamination because they no longer contained standing water, which
had previously dissolved the contaminated material which would eventu-
ally flow into the groundwater. Whatever small amounts of water the pits
were exposed to after they were backfilled would percolate rapidly with-
out picking up any contamination. 385 Thus, any "contamination of Wal-
ton's groundwater [by Phillips] occurred in the 1960's during Phillips'
active operation of the open pits," and any "additional contamination
from the pits ceased when they were backfilled. '386
Noting that the activity which caused the initial contamination of the
groundwater was the operation of the open pits, the court, relying upon
two Texas Supreme Court cases,387 held that such activity was a continu-
377. Id. at 271-72.
378. Id. at 272.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 272-73.





386. Id. at 275.
387. Id. at 273 (relying on Tenn. Gas Transmission Co. v. Fromme, 269 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.
1954) (holding damage resulting from a continuous flow of polluted water on the plaintiff's
land for four years constituted permanent damages as a matter of law, as the cause of
action arose at the time the water began flowing onto the property and not when the extent
of the damages became fully ascertainable some time later) and Vann v. Bowie Sewerage
Co., Inc., 90 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1936) (holding damages resulting from a septic tank which
continuously discharged polluted water into a creek constituted permanent damages)).
20031 1859
SMU LAW REVIEW
ous source of pollution. 388 Furthermore, because "there [was] no evi-
dence that the contamination was ever non-existent or significantly
diminished due to a change in circumstances," the injury cannot be a tem-
porary one and instead must permanent in nature.389 Consequently,
"Walton was required to bring his causes of action within two years of the
initial injury," which would have "accrued no later than the late
1960's."390
Walton argued that the statute of limitations should not bar his claims
due to the Discovery Rule, the continuing tort doctrine, and because Phil-
lips engaged in fraudulent concealment. 391 The court disagreed. 392 The
court held that the Discovery Rule did not apply in this case because
Walton knew by 1993 that some groundwater contamination had oc-
curred.393 In 1993, Walton contacted the Texas Water Commission to in-
quire about concerns regarding his groundwater. 394 The Water
Commission's analysis showed contamination to a certain depth and rec-
ommended further testing to determine the lower limits of the contami-
nation.395 Noting that such information "would cause a reasonably
prudent person to make inquiry into whether his groundwater had been
contaminated," and because "knowledge of facts that could cause a rea-
sonably prudent person to make an inquiry that would lead to discovery
of the cause of action is, 'in the law, equivalent to knowledge of the cause
of action for limitations purposes,"' the court held that Walton's claims
were barred by the statute of limitations because he failed to bring his
claims within two years of discovering the contamination, in 1993.396 The
court held that "because Walton's injury was permanent, the continuing
tort doctrine [did] not apply. '397
Finally, fraudulent concealment did not apply because Phillips, in back-
filling the open pits, was using a "recommended method to remediate the
open pits."'398 Relying upon a recommended method "does not qualify as
deception to conceal a tort," and regardless, because "Walton knew in
1993 that some contamination had occurred," any reliance by Walton af-
ter 1993 "on the alleged deception would have been unreasonable. '399
Consequently, the court held that "any tolling effect would have ended in
1993 with Walton's discovery of the contamination. '400
388. Id. at 274.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 274-75.
391. Id. at 274-76.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 275-76.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. (quoting Walton v. City of Midland, 94 S.W.3d 853, 859 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2000, no pet.)).
397. Id.




OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW
VIII. LITIGATION
Bristol v. Placid Oil Co.40 1 holds that the mandatory venue provision of
Texas Civil Practice and Remedy Code Ann. section 15.011402 applies in
suits for a constructive trust "on the revenue received from the [oil] well
in question and the lease."'403 A mineral "lease" is an interest in land or
realty, and a demand for a constructive trust is an attempt to recover an
interest in "realty. '40 4
Hutchison v. Union Pacific Resources Co. 40 5 holds that a trespass and
conversion claim for taking oil by production is subject to the two-year
statute of limitations.40 6 The court noted that the discovery rule is not
applicable to drainage claims from a common oil or gas reservoir, be-
cause such drainage is not an "inherently undiscoverable injury. ' 40 7 The
court reasoned that an "act of conversion implies a necessary trespass to
complete the taking" and, therefore, "a trespass claim accompanying a
conversion ... would also not be inherently undiscoverable. '40 8
Stirman v. Exxon Corp.409 reverses the trial court's certification of a
class action alleging lessee breached the implied covenant to market
gas.410 Plaintiffs contended that Exxon transferred natural gas within its
own divisions at a lower price than the price realized in third party sales,
causing the royalty owners to receive lower royalty payments.41' The
plaintiffs sought to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 ("Rule 23").412 The trial court certified a class consisting of all royalty
owners in the continental United States, where Exxon was the lessee,
under both proceeds and market value leases, and whose gas was trans-
ferred to an Exxon affiliate during the relevant time period. 413 The class
would include over 13,000 natural gas leases and 67,904 unique interest
owners.
414
Exxon argued that the named plaintiff Hunter's claims were not "typi-
cal" of the claims of the class.415 In Yzaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc.,416
the Texas Supreme Court held that there is no implied covenant to mar-
ket in market value leases, because these leases have their own express
401. Bristol v. Placid Oil Co., 74 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
402. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.001 (Vernon 1986).
403. Bristol, 74 S.W.3d at 158 (quoting Talley v. Howsley, 142 Tex. 81, 176 S.W.2d 158,
160 (1943)) (emphasis in original).
404. Id.
405. Hutchison v. Union Pacific Res. Co., No. 03-01-00196-CV (Tex. App.-Austin, pet.
denied) (not designated for publication), 2001 WL 1337888.
406. Id. at *1.
407. Id. at *3.
408. Id.
409. Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 2002).
410. Id. at 557-58.
411. Id. at 557.
412. Id. at 557-58.
413. Id. at 557.
414. Id. at 559.
415. Id. at 562.
416. Yzaguire v. KCS Res., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. 2001).
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covenant. '417 However, there is such an implied covenant in a proceeds
lease. 418 "Therefore, in a class action based on alleged breach of an im-
plied covenant to market, there cannot be typicality where there are both
market value and proceeds leases included in the class, at least under
Texas law."'419 The Plaintiffs argued that because Hunter had both forms
of leases, Hunter was typical of the class. However, Rule 23 requires that
the claims be typical, not the plaintiff.420 Therefore, Hunter's claims were
not "typical" of the class as defined.421 The court expressly approved the
reasoning in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bowden,422 which decertified a
class including both market value and proceeds leases, after the decision
in Yzaguirre.423
The court also rejected the certification under Rule 23(a)(4) (requiring
adequacy of representation), because the trial court failed to consider the
adequacy of Hunter (the named plaintiff) as a class representative. 424
Moreover, the court noted that it was unlikely that Hunter could meet
the test because her claims were not typical. Because she had both forms
of leases, one could be more valuable than the other, and it was possible
that the different states had different applicable statutes, such as the stat-
ute of limitations. 425
The court also rejected the trial court's analysis under Rule 23(b)(3)
(whether common questions of law or fact predominate over individual
questions) because the "differences in the law of the jurisdictions at issue
demonstrate that the law is not uniform as to any implied covenant to
market, or at least that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated uniform-
ity.' ' 426 This required that the "states whose law is at issue must [at least]
recognize an implied covenant to market, which [was] the heart of this
class action. '427 The court analyzed the law in all of the states consid-
ered, and it found that the implied covenant to market was different
among the states recognizing the covenant, and that five of the states had
not actually determined that such a covenant is implied. 428 On remand,
"plaintiffs would have to show uniformity [as] to all relevant aspects of
states' laws."'429
Finally, the court rejected the class certification because the trial court
failed to consider whether a class action was a superior method for adju-





422. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bowden, No. 14-00-01184-CV (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] Oct. 18, 2001, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication), 2001 WL 1249995, at
*1-2.
423. Stirman, 280 F3d at 562 n.6.
424. Id. at 563.
425. Id. at 562 n.7.
426. Id. at 566.
427. Id. at 564.
428. Id. at 564-66.
429. Id. at 565 n.22.
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dicating this controversy. 430
Taub v. Houston Pipeline Co. 431 considers the application of the Dis-
covery Rule to causes of action related to surface usage by lessee. The
Bammel Field was converted to a gas storage facility under a Unitization
Agreement and a separate Collateral Agreement.432 The operator sur-
rendered many of the rights derived from the original lease, but retained
certain surface locations necessary to the storage operations. The opera-
tor's right to use the well sites was subject to abandonment and termina-
tion under the Collateral Agreement. 433 Taub raised various breach of
contract claims related to the use of the well sites.434
Houston Pipeline raised the affirmative defense that the statute of limi-
tations had passed.435 Taub contended that as to the breach of contract
action the Discovery Rule applied.436 The "Discovery Rule" is an excep-
tion to the general rule that an action does not accrue until a plaintiff
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of
the wrongful act and resulting injury. 437 "The alleged injury involved tan-
gible things: oil and gas, exploration activities occurring on the surface of
land located in a metropolitan area. Whether drilling equipment is lo-
cated on the surface area is readily apparent by the mere viewing. '438
The court held that "the injury alleged in this case [was] not inherently
undiscoverable" and, therefore, the Discovery Rule did not apply.439 The
court noted that diligence is required of the surface owner, which goes
beyond mere observation, requiring inquiry, and that forms filed with the
Railroad Commission could also provide notice.440 The court also
seemed to hold these lessors to a higher standard because they were "so-
phisticated and active participants in oil and gas matters."'441 Similarly,
Taub's claim of fraudulent concealment to toll the running of the statue
as to the contract claims was denied because the well sites were in plain
view.442 Taub's trespass claims were also barred by limitations, and the
court rejected any application of the Discovery Rule to preserve these
claims.443
430. Id. at 566.
431. Taub v. Houston Pipeline Co., 75 S.W.3d 606 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet.
denied).
432. Id. at 612.
433. Id. at 612-13.
434. Id. at 614.
435. Id. at 618.
436. Id. at 618-19.
437. Id. at 619.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 619-20.
441. Id. at 620.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 620-21.
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